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ABSTRACT
Substantial economies of scale in the production of information goods give reasons for considering the 
outsourcing of the production. The trade in information goods – resulting from the outsourcing of the 
production – is a typical transaction which can be analysed using transaction cost theory. Taking into 
account the particular characteristics of information goods and the process of delivering them 
through digital networks, three out of five sources of transaction costs can be identified which are 
most relevant for the outsourcing decision. In designing the transaction process, these sources 
(bounded rationality, opportunism and uncertainty) can be influenced by the transaction partners in 
order to reduce market-based transaction costs. Employing an intermediary can further reduce 
transaction costs resulting from bounded rationality and uncertainty but can (overall) also give rise to 
opportunism. We find that opportunism is the most relevant source of transaction costs if an 
intermediary is employed on the market for information goods. 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Content Syndication describes a familiar way of generating income in the media industry. According 
to this concept, content is created once and then multiply sold to different customers for commercial 
re-use [Anding/Hess, 2001: 4]. Examples include newspaper comic strips, columns and common TV-
serials. Recently, the concept became increasingly popular in the online media sector, which is using 
the fast internet infrastructure to publish already created digital content on different websites, in 
intranets or newsletters. After a first enthusiasm and naïve approaches of media companies and start-
ups to utilise the new business model, a thorough economic analysis is needed in order to assess the 
viability and potential of online content syndication. Explanatory approaches can be found in 
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organisational theories, of which the transaction cost theory is one of the most important and fruitful. 
Transaction cost theory has already been applied widely for organisational problems on the basis of 
the changed role of information as a production factor [Choo, 1991]. In the paper on hand we examine 
the role of transaction costs for organisational problems when information becomes the product itself. 
Further, the paper outlines possible courses of action which the participants in online content 
syndication should follow in order to minimise transaction costs. In chapter 2, we introduce online 
content syndication and transaction cost theory and specify particularities of transaction costs 
occurring in content syndication. In chapter 3 we analyse transaction cost sources in bilateral content 
exchange between originator and publisher and reveal transaction cost sources with most significance. 
Chapter 4 describes how intermediary institutions affect these most significant transaction cost 
sources. Concluding remarks are given in chapter 5. Altogether, the paper provides a theoretical 
analysis of the subject and does not take into account empirical research. However, the analysis on 
hand complies with empirical findings of failed and successful content syndication business models 
(like the case of iSyndicate, Inc.). 
2.  BACKGROUND 
2.1. Online Content Syndication 
The term content is used quite vaguely in theory and practise while an elaborate economic definition is 
still missing. The word is often used overlapping with or in connection with the term “information 
good”, implying that content can be sold as a good on a market. In theory, definitions rank from 
“information essentially is everything that can be digitised” [Shapiro/Varian, 1998], to (information 
goods are) “the smallest logical unit of information that does not exhibit technological 
complementarities, such as a news story, a photograph or a song” [Bakos/Brynjolfsson, 1996] and 
“content is usually taken to mean professionally prepared material such as books, movies, sports 
events, or music” [Odlyzko, 2001]. Practitioners often speak of content as “everything that is 
presented on a website”. The media industry uses the term more pragmatically to address “information 
offered as a product on the market” [Hess, 2001]. Most of these definitions omit the technical 
perspective of content being information which is independent from any transport media. No 
definition takes into account that content is always connected with copyrights (as a form of property 
rights). Approaching an economically sensible definition, we consider content as “an abstract term for 
information and its copyrights, existing independently from transport media, that is – economically or 
in any other way – valuable for an audience and offered on a market” [Anding/Hess, 2001: 3]. 
Content can easily be stored digitally in order to be delivered through digital networks.
The term syndication describes the “sale of the same good to many customers” [Werbach, 2000: 86] 
and has commonly been used in the media industry for long. First established in the early 20’s in the 
USA when syndication named the repeated distribution of movies in cinemas in order to 
commercialise it over again, the term has recently been applied to the re-sale of already produced (and 
published) content to different publishers in any traditional media (TV, radio, print, etc.) [Sedge, 
2000]. Currently, with the emerging internet and the widespread use of digital content on websites, on 
intranets, in newsletters, etc., syndication is used in an inflationary way to describe the commercial 
exchange of content between originators and different publishers on the internet. We term this recent 
development online content syndication, characterising the transition of the traditional syndication 
concept to the online media sector. Using the internet as an infrastructure for content syndication does 
not only effect the speed of the content delivery but also the syndication concept as a whole. We no 
longer speak of syndication only as a re-use of content at different times, but also by different 
publishers at the same time.
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We should add by way of explanation that online content syndication can either take place directly 
between originators and publishers (1) or by employing an intermediary (Content Syndicator) (2). 









Figure 1: Different organisational arrangements for online content syndication 
Online content syndication predominantly involves the recurring delivery of information products 
according to a pre-defined scheme. Examples are given by comic strips published daily or weekly in 
different newspapers. However, depending on the specificities of the exchanged information product, 
also nonrecurring delivery is possible. 
2.2. Transaction Cost Theory 
Transaction cost theory is embedded in the framework of the new institutional economics, comprising 
three other theoretical approaches, which are property rights theory, contract theory and principal 
agent theory [Picot/Reichwald/Wigand, 2001: 46; Krause, 1996]. Transaction cost theory can 
generally be applied for problems which can be represented as contract-problems [Picot/Dietl, 1990: 
182; Rüdiger, 1998: 34], where two or more parties are involved. The most important application is 
the decision problem of make-or-buy, i.e. the decision between hierarchical integration and market-
based organisation of the production [Picot/Dietl, 1990: 182] – as an explanation for the existence of 
firms. Further, transaction cost theory is applied for decisions on the organisation of markets, namely 
the employment of intermediaries within the process of market transactions [Sarkar/Butler/Steinfield, 
1995] as well as for the design of inter-organisational co-operations. A transaction is defined as the 
transfer of property rights [Picot/Dietl, 1990: 178; Picot/Reichwald/Wigand, 2001: 50], whereas 
property rights are the rights of individuals to the use, alteration, income and transfer of resources [De 
Alessi, 1990: 8; Picot/Dietl/Franck, 1999: 55]. 
Transaction cost theory was introduced by COASE [1937], who analysed why firms exist, what
determines the number of firms and what firms do. He found, that the theoretical interest in this subject 
was surprisingly rather small up to this time. COASE spoke indirectly of the cost of using the market 
mechanism for exchanging goods and services, without explicitly using the term transaction cost.
Later, WILLIAMSON developed an elaborate framework of transaction cost theory, based on two 
assumptions of human behaviour (bounded rationality and opportunism) and three key dimensions of 
transactions (asset specificity, uncertainty and frequency) as the basic sources of transaction costs 
[Williamson, 1975].  
Bounded rationality results from human (i.e. decision maker’s) limits on cognitive capabilities and 
imperfect information [Simon, 1957; Selten, 1998]. Simon defines economic actors as “intendedly
rational but only limitedly so” [Simon, 1961: xxiv]. Thus, humans are inclined to make erroneous 
decisions. Opportunism describes the human self-interest in taking actions, including cheating, lying 
and infringing contracts [Williamson, 1993: 458]. Asset specificity terms the significance of certain 
assets that support a specific transaction. These are assets which cannot be transferred to or used 
within other transactions [Williamson, 1981: 555]. WILLIAMSON mentions four types of asset 
specificity: site- , physical assets- and human asset specificity as well as dedicated assets. Uncertainty 
is embodied in any kind of future action and frequency describes how often a specific transaction takes 
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place. The magnitude of these five parameters determines the scale of transaction costs occurring. 
Typically, the frequency of a transaction lowers transaction costs due to economies of scale, while all 
other four parameters have an increasing effect – whereby asset specificity carries most influence 
[Williamson, 1981: 555]. Figure 2 shows a synopsis of the transaction cost sources mentioned above 

















Figure 2: Sources of transaction costs
According to the process of executing a transaction, different components of transaction costs can be 
identified. COASE distinguishes between costs of „discovering what the relevant prices are” and the 
“costs of negotiating and concluding a separate contract for each exchange transaction” [Coase, 1937: 
21]. PICOT/REICHWALD/WIGAND perceive in more detail costs of initiation, agreement, execution,
monitoring and adjustment [Picot/Reichwald/Wigand, 2001: 50]. 
Transaction costs vary among different organisational arrangements and can be distinguished into 
internal (within a firm) or external (on the market) transaction costs. According to COASE, this fact 
determines the existence of firms – in cases where external transaction costs on the market exceed 
internal costs within the firm. “Within a firm, these market transactions are eliminated and in place of 
the complicated market structure with exchange transactions is substituted the entrepreneur-co-
ordinator, who directs production” [Coase, 1937: 19]. In fact, not only the transaction costs but also 
the production costs vary among different organisational arrangements. Thus, the sum of production- 
and transaction cost is the criterion for which organisational arrangement, either market or hierarchy, 
is efficient. Transaction cost theory regularly assumes production costs being equal for both 
organisational arrangements. 
2.3. Content Syndication and Transaction Costs 
Transaction cost theory was introduced independently from the actual product as the subject of the 
transaction. However, a transaction can be realised the more efficient the better the characteristics of 
the organisational arrangement match the requirements which result from the characteristics of the 
transaction and the transaction partners [Rüdiger, 1998: 33]. In the scope of this paper we will discuss 
characteristics of information goods and the content syndication process in order to assess the sources 
of transaction costs and the efficiency of different organisational arrangements for the content 
production and -distribution. Therefore we will shortly explain the components of transaction costs 
occurring in content syndication and in section 3 and 4 of the paper we will focus on the sources of
transaction costs (according to figure 2) in the field of content syndication.  
transaction cost  
component
 occurrence in content syndication 
initiation - search for content seller or buyer 
- assessment of product samples 
agreement - negotiation and contract design with focus on usage- and copyrights 
execution - one-time or recurring delivery of content 
- transfer of property rights 
monitoring - monitoring of content quality 
- monitoring of copyright infringements 
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adjustment - re-definition and re-negotiation of the contract 
Table 1: Transaction cost components in content syndication 
According to WILLIAMSON, “Exchanges that are supported by transaction specific investments are 
neither faceless nor instantaneous” [Williamson, 1984: 202]. This statement does not longer hold for 
content syndication, since it becomes possible that transactions are conducted by intelligent 
technology, automatically negotiating contracts and instantaneously creating transaction specific 
“investments” like DTDs and exchange protocols. This again emphasises the changes in content 
transactions due to the emerging digital technology and reinforces the importance of a specific 
transaction cost analysis for the subject on hand. 
3.  OUTSOURCING OF THE CONTENT PRODUCTION 
In order to design a socio-economic relationship in an economically reasonable way, the influencing 
parameters (i.e. sources) of transaction costs are to be assessed and the advantageous organisational 
arrangement is to be chosen [Picot/Dietl, 1990: 182]. Folowing this procedure, we want to analyse 
transaction cost sources in content syndication and discuss how the transaction process can be 
designed in order to handle transaction costs effectively. 
3.1. Analysis of the transaction cost sources  
Bounded rationality 
Content syndication on the basis of digital networks does both mitigate and increase bounded 
rationality. It mitigates bounded rationality due to an electronically supported reduction in search costs 
and the possibility to offer product samples of digital information products at close to zero cost. 
Bounded rationality is increased due to a wider availability of transaction opportunities since the 
electronic market is not spatially limited and information goods are generally difficult to be valued 
(since cost based valuation is infeasible [Shapiro/Varian, 1998]). Neither does the originator know 
about the commercial potential of its products for the publisher, nor does the publisher know about the 
production cost and re-usability of the product – this complicates product valuation. 
Decisive for bounded rationality in content transactions is the information paradox. Acquiring 
externally produced information involves the inability of evaluation prior to consumption, impeding 
the buyer to rationally decide between different offerings. In the case of content syndication, where the 
buyer does not consume but commercialise the product, content can well be assessed prior to the re-
sale, i.e. prior to the transfer of property rights from the originator to the buyer. However, the buyer 
faces various offerings and cannot fully assess all information products available, especially in 
recurring delivery (e.g. several news stories a day), and confronts information overload. Further the 
commercial potential of certain information products is rather vaguely to be determined from the 
subscriber’s point of view (adverse selection issue).  
Opportunism
Content syndication offers various options for opportunism for both the originator and the subscriber 
of content – particularly when their contact is based to a large extent on the internet and exhibits a high 
level of anonymity. The originator can take advantage of the subscriber’s experience problem by 
delivering poor quality content or he can deliver content in a way differing from the agreed upon 
delivery scheme, e.g. not in time or not in the right data format (moral hazard issue). Both, originator 
and subscriber can cheat on copyright agreements by re-selling exclusively delivered content to third 
parties. The subscriber can modify content what he might not be allowed to (i.e. he does not possess 
the property right of alteration). Generally, these courses of action, especially the disobeying to 
copyright agreements, are difficult to monitor (i.e. only at high costs) for the other party. This gives 
rise to opportunism in content syndication.  
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Asset specificity 
Asset specificity describes the extent to which parties are locked into a transaction relationship and 
splits into four categories [Williamson, 1981: 555; Joskow, 1991: 126]. We will discuss these 
categories separately in respect of the specific product and transaction process on hand. 
Site specificity occurs if transaction-related investments are specifically bound to a certain location. 
In the internet it is – at first view – only negligibly relevant where transaction partners are located 
since distance becomes less important and content can globally be transferred in seconds. However, 
site specificity occurs if the legal framework (i.e. copyright law) is taken into consideration, which 
often varies significantly among countries and which is highly important for the distribution of 
content.
Physical asset specificity describes specific investments in real assets (e.g. machines) which are 
specifically necessary for the transaction. Digital information products are stored and transferred using 
standard technology (computer hardware) and – besides specifically designed programs – also 
standard software (e.g. standard internet protocols like TCP/IP or databases). These assets are 
constantly becoming less expensive and can easily be utilised for other purposes. Thus, physical asset 
specificity is not relevant for content syndication. 
Human asset specificity is highly relevant for both the production of content and the execution of 
the transaction. Content as an intellectual product needs specific human abilities for production (and 
classification) and the transaction is based on complicated contracts designed by human experts. 
Human investments in personal relationships and knowledge about the transaction partner (i.e. 
knowledge on information needs and offerings) are also important. However, contract-related human 
asset specificity will become less relevant in the long run as standardised skeleton contracts are 
developed and agent based automatic contract negotiation becomes viable. Also for supporting tasks 
(content classification, selection and transfer) human asset specificity is decreasingly relevant due to 
advancing technology.  
Dedicated assets are developed or acquired in order to conduct transactions with a particular 
partner or group of partners. Investments in dedicated assets would not be made if there was no 
prospect of exchanging a significant amount of a product. In the field of content syndication, these are 
specific technical frameworks for the standardised exchange of content (e.g. document type definitions 
(DTDs) for XML, or specific protocols like ICE or NITF) which are specifically used for content 
transactions. While ICE and NITF provide standardised protocols and don’t vary among the partners 
using them, DTDs describe a specific data format and can be idiosyncratic for the content exchange 
among two partners. We conclude that dedicated assets are highly relevant for content transactions if 
long term relations are considered. 
Table 2 summarises the findings for asset specificity and assesses asset specificity for content 
syndication. 
Site specificity - location not relevant for content transfer 
- but: relevant in respect of international copyright law 
 moderately relevant for content transactions 
Physical asset specificity - necessary hard- and software increasingly inexpensive 
- standard technology can be used for other purposes 
 marginally relevant for content transactions 
Human asset specificity - intellectual capital needed for content production/classification and 
contract design 
- standard skeleton contracts need less human involvement 
 marginally relevant for content transactions in the long run 
Dedicated assets - specific exchange protocols and document type definitions 
 highly relevant for content transactions 
Table 2: Assessment of asset specificity 
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Asset specificity is usually considered to have the most influence on the issue of which organisational 
arrangement (market or hierarchy) is most efficient [Williamson, 1991: 284]. Thus, as the importance 
of asset specificity decreases, not only due to internet technology but due to the specificities of the 
product itself, we expect a move to the market for digital information products. 
Uncertainty
Uncertainty is connected with and primarily results from opportunism and bounded rationality. It can 
be distinguished between a primary (or strategic) and a secondary (non-strategic) kind of uncertainty 
[Williamson, 1984: 62]. Primary uncertainty occurs because of misleading and disguising behaviour of 
the interactors (behavioural uncertainty), secondary uncertainty results from a lack of communication 
[Koopmans, 1957: 147] and unpredictable environmental conditions. 
While the second kind of uncertainty is likely to decrease in pure electronic markets (due to extended 
possibilities for communication and a higher information intensity of the transaction), the first kind is 
rather increasing, since now parties are able to become trading partners whose internet-based contacts 
have a higher level of anonymity - giving rise to opportunism. Further, using the extended means of 
communication can easily be avoided by parties of the transaction (or abused for false information), 
thus increasing the level of uncertainty for the other party. On the other hand, quality uncertainty, 
resulting from the product-inherent experience problem, can be mitigated through easily available 
product samples. 
Frequency
“The cost of specialised governance structures will be easier to recover for large transactions of a 
recurring kind” [Williamson, 1984: 206]. Transaction frequency influences the possibility to 
economize on transaction- as well as production cost due to economies of scale and scope. 
WILLIAMSON’s statement implies that low transaction frequency favours market organisation while 
high frequency offers economies of scale in hierarchical production. However, due to the specific cost 
structure of digital information goods, this conclusion has to be reassessed. High frequency of 
transactions allows economies of scale in both hierarchical and market organisations and generally 
reduces transaction costs. Since no clear statement is possible on whether high frequency favours 
market or hierarchy, frequency of transaction plays no decisive role [Picot/Dietl, 1990: 180]. 








- valuation difficulties for experience goods 
- information overload due to proliferative content offerings 
- commercial potential of information products unclear for subscriber 
++
opportunism - delivery of poor quality or not-agreed formats in a not-agreed upon scheme 




- use of standard technology and standard protocols 
- decreasing relevance of human asset specificity in the long term 
0
uncertainty - results from high bounded rationality and opportunities for opportunism 
- also: high level of anonymity on electronic markets 
++
frequency - no clear statement if high frequency still necessitates hierarchical organisation 
- generally: less relevance of frequency due to less relevance of asset specificity 
0
Table 3: Assessment of transaction cost sources in content syndication 
3.2. Designing the content transaction 
We have found that three sources of transaction costs are particularly relevant for online content 
syndication – bounded rationality, opportunism and uncertainty. Bearing in mind that content 
syndication involves massive economies of scale in the content production and is – considering 
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production costs – regularly preferable against in-house production, we want to analyse in a further 
step, which types of digital content are suited for content syndication (i.e. involve low bounded 
rationality, opportunism and uncertainty) and which options transaction partners have in designing the 
transaction process in order to reduce the sources of transaction costs. 
Properties and relevant attributes of digital information goods 
In contrast to physical goods, (particularly digital) information goods are costly to produce but cheaply 
to reproduce, i.e. they exhibit high first-copy-costs [Shapiro/Varian, 1998: 3]. Digital information 
goods can easily be copied without loss in quality, easily altered (customised) and transported through 
digital networks. Thus, markets for digital information goods don’t exhibit scarcity, information goods 
are never consumed. Due to missing technical restrictions in copying, the enforcement of copyrights is 
more difficult in comparison to markets for offline media (e.g. the book market). Thus, in analysing 
the market for digital information goods, the consideration of copyrights is essential. Further, 
information goods are experience goods, their quality cannot be assessed prior to consumption. This 
“information paradox” causes problems for the ex-ante valuation of information goods.  
In addition to these general properties, digital information goods have various attributes which are 
economically important and can affect bounded rationality, opportunism and uncertainty in the 
transaction. BALLOU ET AL. mention timeliness, data quality, cost, and value [Ballou et al., 1994] of 
which we consider most important the speed of devaluation (timeliness) and value (which includes 
data quality). Additionally relevant is the size of the target group as it is significant for the content 
value. Other attributes like data volume and media richness influence transaction costs too, but are not 
correlated with bounded rationality, opportunism or uncertainty. Speed of devaluation is positively 
correlated with bounded rationality and uncertainty, since higher speed leaves less time for gathering 
information on the product. Short time leaves less space for opportunism which becomes less relevant 
with high speed of devaluation. In contrast, high value of information goods increases the incentives 
for opportunism but has negligible effect on bounded rationality. A side-effect of high value goods 
being connected with brand names is a reduction in secondary uncertainty. As the size of the target 
group is one factor determining the value of a good, large size has a rising effect on opportunism, but 
reduces bounded rationality and uncertainty due to wider availability of information on the target 
group and the profit potential of the information good. Since most attributes of information goods 
affect transaction costs in both directions, we cannot give a general statement on which goods are 
suited best for content syndication. By tendency – if we consider opportunism as a factor with minor 
impact (i.e. if it can easily be covered by contracts or the relationship is based on trust), high value 
information goods for a broad target group, which are slowly devaluating, are better suited for 
outsourcing than low value, rapidly devaluating goods for a small target group. Considering 
opportunism a major factor, the correlation is vice versa. 
Opportunities for transaction partners 
Independently from the type of content exchanged, transaction partners have options to influence the 
levels of bounded rationality, opportunism and uncertainty by either modifying product attributes or 
the transaction process. Transaction partners have technical, economical and legal opportunities to 
exert influence. 
Bounded rationality 
Economically, the experience problem can be mitigated by providing product samples or signalling 
product quality (e.g. through brand names). In order to reduce information overload, intelligent 
information systems for search- and classification can be employed which reduce search costs.
Opportunism
Technically, content can be modified to prevent or track unauthorized copying or to reduce the value 
of a copied version. Further, using technical standards can limit the freedom of both partners to modify 
technical agreements. Economically, the speed of devaluation can be increased by providing new 
versions of the product in shorter duration. Another way of creating economic incentives against 
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opportunism could be revenue sharing between originator and publisher. Legal opportunities arise 
from copyright law and are bound to the extent to which property rights are transferred. Transaction 
partners can reduce opportunism by contractually defining detailed property rights for both partners. 
Transaction costs are reduced if standardised contract templates are used. 
Uncertainty
Strategic uncertainty, resulting from misleading behaviour of the transaction partners, can be reduced 
as described for opportunism. Non-strategic uncertainty decreases as contract duration increases, thus 
transaction partners should aim at long-term contracts.  
4. INTERMEDIATION IN ONLINE CONTENT SYNDICATION 
Online content syndication between two parties can cause considerable transaction costs – especially 
during the initial phases of a transaction (particularly search costs). As the employment of 
intermediaries potentially reduces market transaction costs, we will focus in the following on the 
impact of intermediation on online content syndication. 
4.1. Intermediary impact on the transaction costs sources 
We want to assess the impact of intermediaries on bounded rationality, opportunism and uncertainty as 
well as on possible new sources of transaction costs which might arise from intermediation. „An 
intermediary, also called a middleman or broker in the research literature in various fields, helps to 
facilitate transactions between buyers and sellers by providing value-added services such as 
aggregation and distribution of products and product information, quality checks and warranties“ 
[Chircu/Kauffman, 2000]. BAILEY mentions aggregation, pricing, search and trust as roles of 
intermediaries [Bailey, 1998: 33]. Merchant intermediaries (for a distinction of merchant and broker 
intermediaries see [Rose, 1999: 67]) cover a set of trade functions: quantity function, assortment
function, advertising- and consulting function as well as spatial, temporal and financial demand 
adaptation function [Gümbel, 1985: 168; Müller-Hagedorn, 1998: 108]. In respect of information 
goods, the quantity function and the spatial demand adaptation function are less relevant since 
electronic reproduction- and transportation capacities are almost costless.  
Bounded rationality 
Based on the advertising function of the intermediary, bounded rationality in online content 
syndication can be significantly decreased due to a reduction in the number of contacts, hence, a 
reduction in search costs, resulting from the Baligh-Richartz-Effect, exemplary depicted in Figure 3 
[Gümbel, 1985: 110], and due to assessment of product quality by the intermediary [Becker, 2001: 
11]. It is assumed, that only one intermediary exists and transaction partners do not confront search 
























Figure 3 : Reduction in search costs through intermediation (Baligh-Richartz-Effect) 
In addition to search costs, also contracting costs are reduced, since each transaction partner only has 
to enter one contract with the intermediary even if content is exchanged with more that one party. The 
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intermediary represents a single point of contact for originators and publishers whose cognitive 
disability to perceive and valuate all available information products is reduced due to a pre-valuation 
and categorisation by the intermediary (assortment function). The independent pre-valuation (pricing) 
of information products, based on the intermediary’s experience and market knowledge, notably 
reduces bounded rationality (consulting function).  
Opportunism
Opportunism can be reduced through the intermediary’s assortment function, providing a pre-selection 
of originators and publishers which reduces the risk of adverse selection. Intermediaries can act as 
trusted third parties (trust role), supervising the transaction and defining a framework for the design of 
contracts (consulting function). Besides standardised contract design, intermediaries can provide a 
technical platform for the content exchange, leaving few space for copyright infringements.  
Uncertainty
Primary uncertainty is reduced by the intermediary as it is described for bounded rationality and 
opportunism. Secondary uncertainty is mitigated by the demand adaptation functions of the 
intermediary. The uncertainties in supply and demand of single originators and publishers are 
alleviated – the intermediary can provide a steady level of content offerings and content demand and 
even out inequalities. Financial uncertainty can be reduced through financial demand adaptation, 
aligning the required payment schemes of originators and publishers. The intermediary can reduce 
financial uncertainty by taking contingency risk. 
 bounded rationality opportunism uncertainty 
assortment 
advertising and consulting 
demand adaptation 
Table 4: Impact of intermediary functions on relevant transaction cost sources ( =reduces, =increases, =no impact). 
Other transaction cost sources 
Besides bounded rationality, opportunism and uncertainty, intermediaries can also influence asset 
specificity and frequency. Asset specificity can be further reduced by standardisation efforts of the 
intermediary and a reduction in necessary specific investments of originators and publishers 
(standardisation of data formats can take place at the intermediary, originators and publishers can keep 
proprietary formats). The heterogeneity of product-representation is reduced. Intermediaries match 
differing demands for frequency of originators and subscribers (demand adaptation function). The 
frequency of transactions performed by the intermediary exceeds the frequency of transactions a single 
transaction partner performs without the intermediary, thus, the intermediary can better realise 
economies of scale. 
Since the intermediary institution is prone to bounded rationality, opportunism and uncertainty, 
intermediation might also rise transaction costs. Bounded rationality results from the intermediary’s 
inability to know all possible transaction partners and their content offerings and demands, as well as 
limitations in perfectly matching them. Further, a specialised intermediary has an information 
advantage over originators and publishers which he can exploit opportunistically. Uncertainty results 
from imperfect knowledge about the future content offerings and demands on the market as well as 
from the intermediary’s uncertainty about the behaviour of transaction partners. 
In contrast with the reductions in transaction costs due to intermediation, which directly result from 
the intermediation function and are not directly influenced by actions of the intermediary, the 
increasing transaction costs due to bounded rationality, opportunism and uncertainty can directly be 
affected by the intermediary’s actions. 
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4.2.  Assessment of intermediation in online content syndication 
We have found that the intermediary institution reduces as well as increases certain sources of 
transaction costs. In order to organise the content syndication transaction per intermediation in an 
optimal way, we have to compare cost and utility of employing an intermediary institution.  
As the intermediary itself can be considered a specific asset for the transaction process, all costs 
occurring at the intermediary level are asset specific costs for originators and publishers. We have to 
compare these asset specific costs with benefits in bounded rationality, opportunism and uncertainty 
(as well as the less relevant asset specificity and frequency). 
Reductions in bounded rationality and uncertainty due to intermediation are substantial (see Table 4) 
and will most probably not be outweighed by accruing bounded rationality and uncertainty of the 
intermediary. In contrast to that, the reduction in opportunism due to the advertising and consulting 
(particularly contracting) function of the intermediary must be considered moderately in comparison 
with additional opportunism of the intermediary institution. This additional opportunism could easily 
prevail. Hence, the focus should be set to opportunism as the source of transaction costs which could 
increase due to intermediation in online content syndication. 
Transaction partners will employ an intermediary if reductions in bounded rationality and uncertainty 
outweigh possible higher opportunism, i.e. if overall transaction cost sources are reduced (assuming 
that the different sources equally result in transaction costs) and this overall reduction compensates the 
intermediary’s service charges. In reality, content intermediaries charged up to 70% of the sales price 
which probably was a reason for the failure of many. Enforcing a reduction of the intermediary’s 
opportunism – either technically, economically or legally – is crucial in designing the content 
syndication transaction via an intermediary. Thus, transaction partners have to carefully design the 
technical infrastructure, the economic incentives for the intermediary (i.e. the percentage of 
commission) and the legal framework of the transaction. Intermediaries can proactively take the 
position of “trusted third parties” [Schoop/List, 2001] in order to signal low opportunism. 
5. CONCLUSION 
The paper on hand analysed the sources of transaction costs in the specific field of online content 
syndication. The first important finding is, that not all five sources of transaction costs are equally 
relevant in this specific field, but bounded rationality, opportunism and uncertainty play the most 
significant role. Asset specificity, generally the most influential factor in transaction cost economics, is 
less important in online content syndication. Further analysis revealed quality and speed of 
devaluation as parameters of information products that affect transaction cost sources as well as 
technical, economical and legal opportunities of transaction partners to reduce of these sources. The 
subsequent analysis of intermediary impact on transaction cost sources showed that intermediaries 
reduce bounded rationality and uncertainty but might increase opportunism in online content 
syndication. The above analysis of which kind of information goods are appropriate for content 
syndication indicates that using intermediaries, rather low value, rapidly devaluating information 
goods for a small target group are suitable – as long as opportunism is a factor with major relevance. 
The focus on employing intermediaries should thus be set on reducing opportunism in order to 
broaden the scope for trade in information goods. Further research in this field should involve property 
rights- and principal agent theory.  
However, some methodological limitations of the analysis are to be considered. The method of 
research can only provide tendency statements, since transaction costs cannot be quantified precisely. 
Transaction costs are not to be taken as the sole basis for an outsourcing decision if production costs 
vary among different organisational arrangements (discussed by [Williamson, 1984: 212]). This is 
particularly relevant for online content syndication since internal and external production costs (i.e. 
first- and second copy costs) vary significantly, making outsourcing profitable even if external 
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transaction costs are high. Besides transaction- and production costs, other effects influence the 
outsourcing decision. Content originators are often reluctant to provide high quality content digitally 
and publishers have difficulties in judging the economic value of externally acquired content. The last 
point is interrelated with a lack of available research on the utility-function of the content consumer. 
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